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Report on Employer-Employée Relations 
in the Public Service of Canada 
Jacob Finkelman 
In this article, the author explains the rationale behinà 
the Finkelman report which contains many proposais for 
législative change in the Public Service Staff Relations Act„ 
Some of the key recommendations are discussed but sub-
stantial considération is also given to the constraints the 
committee had to deal with. 
It is beyond question that we hâve long passed the point of time 
in Canada when the issue as to whether public servants should be per-
mitted to engage in collective bargaining can hâve other than one positive 
answer. But that is not to say that there are no substantial pockets of 
résistance to the principle that we hâve corne to accept in the last seven 
years as the way of life for fédéral public servants. A little over a month 
ago, I addressed a meeting of the Ottawa Chapter of the International 
Personnel Management Association at which one member of the audience 
charged that collective bargaining should be regarded as « basically a 
dangerous, if not destructive, development in a political context ». And 
others preach a gospel of industrial relations, especially for professionals, 
that calls for a return to the idyllic conditions that prevailed in the 
garden of Eden before the fall. Nor ought we to overlock the fact that, 
in our neighbour to the south, the battle is far from being won. The 
rallying cries of abdication of sover-
eignty, unconstitutional délégation 
of powers and so on are still heard 
accross the land. 
FINKELMAN, J., Q.C., Chairman, 
Public Service Staff Relations Board, 
Ottawa. 
* Communication présentée au Congrès de l'Institut Canadien de recherche en 
relations industrielles, Toronto, 1974. 
Paper presented at the Canadian Industrial Relations Research Institute an-
nual meeting, Toronto, 1974. 
** FINKELMAN, J., Employer-Employée Relations in the Public Service of 
Canada, Proposais for Législative Change, Part I, Information Canada, Ottawa, 
1974, 301 p. 
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One must recognize that the very enactment of the Public Service 
Staff Relations A et m 1967 l, altogether apart from its contents, was an 
event of the utmost significance. It took a great deal of political courage 
for the Government, and indeed for Parliament — and that includes the 
members of ail political parties — to pass such a statute. When Govern-
ment is considering what législation ought to be enacted to deal with 
industrial relations in the private sector, it can weigh the interests of 
employers and trade unions in a relatively objective fashion. I do not 
overlook the fact that, in Canada, what is sometimes referred to as the 
private sector législation is applicable to local governmental institutions 
as it is to private industry. But my point still holds true since, in the 
préparation of such législation, Government at the fédéral level, or even 
at the provincial level, is not the employer of the employées in thèse 
institutions. 
I used the phrase in a « relatively objective fashion » a few moments 
ago because, under the parliamentary system, governments consist of 
ministers, some of whom are employers and some of whom may be em-
ployées — the mix varies from time to time. In addition, members of 
Government are subject to pressures from organized employers and orga-
nized employées and, in a démocratie society, must take thèse pressures 
into account. However, in the final analysis what Government bestows on, 
or takes away from, employers or trade unions at any particular time by 
a change in the gênerai labour relations législation is not its own wealth 
or its own rights or privilèges, but the wealth, rights and privilèges of 
others. Thus, in determining what should be included in labour relations 
législation applicable to the private sector, Government stands, in a man-
ner of speaking, above the fray. 
The position is quite différent when one is dealing with législation 
applicable to public servants in a major sovereign jurisdiction. Hère the 
Governement wears two hats; it is the employer and it also bears respon-
sibility for producing the législation framework for the governance of its 
relation with its employées. By the very fact that it enacts législation 
which accords to its employées the right to engage in collective bargaining, 
it has surrendered its authority to establish certain conditions applicable 
to them by unilatéral action and has made those conditions subject to 
shared decision-making. It has given up some of its own powers, not 
merely decreed that someone else may hâve to give up some of the au-
thority which he formerly enjoyed. 
i R.S.C. 1970, c. P-35. 
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THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE 1967 PUBLIC SERVICE STAFF 
RELATIONS ACT 
Every statute dealing with collective bargaining invalidâtes many 
established or conventional rights, interests, privilèges and modalities. In 
the public service context, the Heeney Committee2 in the first instance, 
and the Government and Parliament at a later stage, had to take into 
considération what measures had been adopted in the past to govern 
employer-employée relations in the public service of Canada and to dé-
termine which of thèse measures should be abandoned, which modified 
and what new rights and obligations ought to be created. No one knew 
how the new mechanism that was about to corne into being would work; 
ueither the employer nor the staff associations had had any expérience 
with collective bargaining procédures as such — there had been a form 
consultation that could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be de-
scribed as joint decision-making; the Civil Service Commission did hâve 
authority in matters of appointaient and promotion to impose its will on 
the parties but, in matters of release for incompétence or incapacity, 
its authority was limited to the making of recommendations rather than 
binding décisions. It is scarcely surprising that, whatever the public 
posture of the various interests may hâve been at the time, both staff 
associations and the Government were hésitant to give up powers or 
advantages that they had enjoyed under previous législation and they 
looked upon the new régime with some misgivings. This frame of mind 
accounts for some of the limitations that were imposed in the Public 
Service Staff Relations Act on the joint decision-making process that was 
incorporated in it. 
Another factor that must hâve caused the authors of the législation 
a great deal of concern was the nature of the bargaining community to 
which the législation was made applicable and the wide dispersion of its 
members. The community was extraordinary in size — some 230,000 
persons were covered — I venture to say the largest community ever 
brought instantly into collective bargaining at any one time in any juris-
diction. By the middle of the 1960s, such a large percentage of fédéral 
public employées were already members of staff associations that it was 
obvious thèse associations would be certified as bargaining agents for the 
respective units within a few months after the législation came into force. 
The commencement of bargaining for so many bargaining units at about 
2 Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in The Public Service, Otta-
wa, August 1963. 
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the same time placed a very heavy burden both on the employer and on the 
bargaining agents. 
The community was also extraordinary in its complexity. It consisted 
of blue-collar workers of the types who, in the private sector, had tradi-
tionally availed themselves of the rights conferred by private sector labour 
relations législation, but even then only to the extent of about 30% of 
the eligible working force in Canada. It included large numbers of white-
collar workers, whose private sector counterparts had long been covered 
by the private sector législation, but who hâve only recently and very 
gingerly begun to organize into trade unions. It included many diverse 
professionals, some of whom — such as the members of the traditional 
professions of law, médecine and engineering — had been expressly ex-
cluded from private sector législation, and many others who,in the past, 
hâve regarded collective bargaining as incompatible with their profes-
sional interests. Is included supervisory employées, and that well before 
similar types were brought within the Canada Labour Code 3 or most 
provincial législation. Finally, the community was dispersed throughout 
the whole country, and indeed throughout the world, in literally thousands 
of locations. The unknown quantity of what might be the outcome of 
bargaining and whether it would be possible to préserve some désirable 
degree of uniformity with respect to conditions of employment for ail 
thèse diverse éléments indicated a cautious approach to the scope of 
bargaining. 
In a continuation of our examination of what considérations had to 
be taken into account when collective bargaining législation for fédéral 
public servants was first formulated, there was the perplexing question 
as to where the line is to be drawn between what can be left, in a démo-
cratie society, to be determined through a process of decision-making 
shared by the employer and the représentatives of the employées and what 
must be determined by the normal législative process. There was, at the 
time, little or nothing previous expérience in the public service of Canada 
or in any other major jurisdiction to serve as a guide. The report of the 
Heeney Committee avoids any philosophie discussion of this problem. 
With the benefit of hindsight, I hâve expressed my views on this question 
in Part I of my report and I believe thèse views were apposite to con-
ditions as they existed in 1965, 1966 and 1967, as they are to conditions 
in 1974. I said : 
3 S.C. 1970 c. 18. 
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No matter what extensions are made in the scope of bargaining from 
time to time, some subjects will probably remain in which the public 
interest will be paramount to any interest that the employées in the 
Public Service and the organizations representing them may hâve in 
bargaining, where the protection and furtherance of thèse interests 
cannot be left to shared decision-making by the employer and the em-
ployée organizations through bargaining, but must be examined and 
established by those who are answerable to the electorate. As one 
scholarly observer of the scène has put it « One ought never to confuse 
the wishes of a limited interest group like a union with those of the 
entire electorate. » Class size in schools, case load for social workers 
and doctors, for example, may be legitimate subjects of bargaining to 
the extent to which they are aspects of the work load that employées 
are required to perforai, but not when demands with regard to thèse 
matters are presented as an aspect of what constitutes good educa-
tional policy, or good welfare policy or good médical policy. The 
quality of éducation, of welfare and of médical care ought to be 
decided only through the normal législative process. At times, it may 
be very difficult to draw the line between what can be entrusted 
to collective bargaining and what must be reserved to be dealt with 
only through the démocratie process of législation. But the line has 
to be drawn nevertheless to stay within the System as we hâve it. 
Add also to the foregoing that, in 1967, many public servants found 
the thought of going on strike to be revolting and abhorrent. A process 
had to be devised for the resolution of disputes, in which those portions 
of the public service populated by employées who held thèse views might 
become involved, that would afford them an opportunity to protect and 
further their collective interest without being driven to withdraw their 
services. There were others whose capacity to conduct an effective strike 
was so slight that the use of the strike weapon by them would be coun-
terproductive. This was brough forcefully to my attention when, in the 
early days of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, one of the most 
militant of the bargaining agents opted for the arbitration route. 
To sum up, I am convinced it was inévitable taking into account ail 
that I hâve referred to, that the fédéral législation adopted in 1967 would 
départ in many essential respects from the législation applicable to the 
private sector, whether it be the Industrial Relations Dispute Investigation 
Act5 as it then stood or the more advanced législation that had been 
adopted in the various provinces. 
4
 Employer-Employée Relations in the Public Service of Canada, Proposais 
for Législative Charge, Part I, Jacob Finkelman, chairman, Public Service Staff 
Relations Board, Ottawa, Information Canada, 1974, p. 59. 
5 S.C. 1948, c. 54. 
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THE NEED FOR REVISING THE 1967 LEGISLATION 
Six years hâve gone by since the Public Service Staff Relations Act 
first became law. As is often the sace with any new scheme of social 
législation, some weaknesses hâve corne to light; some expectations as 
to what could be achieved under the Act were disappointed; bargaining 
agents, having acquired a taste for the fruits of joint decision-making, 
began to press for the inclusion of additional matters in which that process 
would be substituted for unilatéral détermination by the employer. Ail 
of this was part of a normal evolutionary process. The question then 
arose, how to meet the needs of the situation. For what are probably 
obvious reasons, the Government felt that any proposai it made for 
amendment of the législation would be taken as the minimal response 
of an employer to a bargaining « demand » by bargaining agents. Some 
third party had to be entrusted with the task of assessing the situation 
and making recommendations. On April 18, 1973, that task was assigned 
to me. 
CREATION OF A REVISORY COMMITTEE 
Whether sélection of myself as the person who should examine the 
existing législation, assess its defects and propose how it should be amend-
ed was good or bad is not for me to say. I can scarcely be regarded as 
an unbiased judge of my own qualifications and capabilities. But the 
choice did hâve certain important conséquences. I can rightfully claim 
to having nursed this législation along for six years, from its earliest days 
— it was, in a spécial sensé, « my baby », with ail that such an intimate 
relationship implies. I hâve spoken about its virtues throughout the length 
and breadth of this country and the United States and visitors hâve 
streamed to Ottawa from many parts of the world to observe what they 
regard as a shining example of how such matters ought to be ordered. 
Altogether apart from my association with the législation, people hâve 
corne to know me over the years as a gradualist, as one who seeks to 
effect a balance between the interests of the two sides to collective bar-
gaining. How anyone could hâve expected me to make a report that 
would recommend very radical changes in the législation is beyond my 
compréhension. I hâve been given to understand that my being designated 
as the person to review the législation had the support of ail political 
parties and the endorsement, not only of the Government, but of the 
bargaining agents as well. I doubt whether any of thèse interests had any 
illusions as to the approach I would adopt and I must assume that they 
regarded that sort of approach as acceptable. 
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Having regard to my continuing responsibilities as Chairman of the 
Public Service Staff Relations Board, there were severe limitations on 
the time frame within which I had to complète the report. I could not 
isolate myself completely from the work of the Board and the longer 
I was occupied on the législative project the less contact would it be 
possible for me to maintain with the work of the Board. The Honourable 
Allan J. MacEachen, the Président of the Privy Council, had indicated 
that there was considérable urgency in having the report produced at as 
early a date as possible. I could not afford the luxury of embarking on 
lengthy research projects. Time was of the essence. The team I recruited 
to assist me consisted of five persons, two on the légal and research side 
and three on what might be described as the policy side. Two of those 
on the policy side were persons who were well qualified to bring to bear 
in our discussions an informed opinion as to the way in which various 
proposais would affect the community from which they were drawn. They 
were Mr. Robert DesLauriers, Research Director of the Public Service 
Alliance of Canada, and Mr. Hugh Tolan, a member of the staff of 
the Treasury Board. The third member of the group was Mr. Paul M. 
Roddick who had been a senior member of the Secrétariat of the Heeney 
Committee and therefore exceedingly well informed as to the thinking 
that went into the recommendations that Committee had made in its report 
in 1965 and into the basic premises of the législation presented to Par-
liament in 1966 and 1967. I think you will agrée with me this was a well 
rounded, balanced, practical team. 
THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED UPON THE COMMITTEE 
As we began to explore the problems that came to our attention, 
it became évident that no solution for some of them could be devised 
without research that would hâve to be conducted over a long period 
of time, that the solution of others might dépend either on the complète 
or radical reorientation of other agencies and would involve time-con-
suming discussions that we could ill afford if we were to meet the required 
time limits. We also had to take into account the political situation and 
the collective bargaining timetable. As to the first of thèse, the bargaining 
agents held the view that the current political situation was the one most 
favourable to their interests and they were anxious that the way be cleared 
for new législation at the earliest possible opportunity. As to the second, 
there are a number of agreements coming up for renewal in the late fall 
and early winter, the negotiations with respect to which would be much 
more difficult under the présent législation than they would be if the 
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législation were amended. In addition, I had a personal, selfish interest 
in getting the job done quickly. I will hâve reached the mandatory retire-
ment âge on January 17, 1977. After the difficult years I hâve spent 
trying to make the machinery work, I would like to hâve a hand in 
breaking in the new model. Consequently, long term solutions and some 
complicated problems had to be left for someone else to deal with and 
résolve at a later date. 
While the time élément was an important considération in estab-
lishing the perimeters of my study, there were also several others of 
practical significance that had to be taken into account ; the nature and 
organization of the public service; the capacities of the bargaining agents 
and of the employer to deal with certain matters in a bargaining context; 
the capacity of the Board to cope efficiently with any vastly increased 
jurisdiction; the desirability of maintaining a large measure of uniformity 
between the législation applicable to the public sector and that applicable 
to the private sector. 
As to the first item just mentioned, I fall back on what appears in 
the report : 
Recommendations for the revision of the Public Service Staff Rela-
tions Act must take into account the needs of a Public Service that 
consists of a great variety of groups, many of which hâve unique 
qualities and conditions of work that distinguish them from other 
public servants. In some situations, a simple solution could be devised 
to meet the needs of one group, but that solution might play havoc 
with the interests of other groups and of a reasonably cohesive Public 
Service. A pattern of collective bargaining législation that is cons-
tructive for the totality of the public service must be one adapted to 
the conditions of as large a proportion of the employées as possible, 
while assuring to each group a reasonable opportunity to govern the 
conditions peculiar to that group. Since législation must be drafted 
in gênerai terms, the best that one can hope to achieve is to find 
the highest factor common to ail groups and then to make allowances 
for déviations but only to an extent that will not destroy the basic 
principles of the scheme. 6 
A related aspect of this problem is that there is both a need and a 
désire in the public service of Canada for the maintenance of uniform 
service-wide conditions in some areas, an objective that can be accom-
plished only by some form of coalition bargaining. Balkanization of the 
public service through agreements entered into on a unit-by-unit basis 
6 Employer-Employée Relations.. . op. cit., p. 5. 
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would tend to establish vested rights in the employées in each unit that 
could not thereafter readily be modified by coalition bargaining for many 
years to corne. I therefore seemed désirable to refrain from making 
certain subject matters bargainable immediately and to provide other 
measures that would pave the way for service-wide bargaining, or bar-
gaining covering a substantial segment of the community, at the time 
the next review of the législation is undertaken. 
To follow in the path laid out in the Canada Labour Code was one 
way of going about the business at hand. The principles embodied in the 
Code had been endorsed by Parliament and the Government would be 
hard put to refuse to make applicable to public servants the rules that 
it had laid down for employers in the private sector. Thus, to the extent 
to which the Canada Labour Code improved on the provisions of the 
Public Service Staff Relations Act, in so far as the interests of the em-
ployées were concerned, the Canada Labour Code usually, but not uni-
versally, served me as a model. On the other hand, I had to bear in 
mind that, if I went much beyond what was provided for in the Canada 
Labour Code, I might encounter stiff résistance from the employer. If 
my recommendations were to call for spécial privilèges to be accorded 
to public servants, the Government would be under pressure to extend 
thèse privilèges to the private sector as well. What I had to weigh was 
not so much the question as to whether a certain privilège should be 
extended to public servants but rather, in view of what I said earlier, 
whether the political considérations that might be involved in the Gov-
ernment making up its mind as to the impact of the recommendations 
on the private sector would delay the implementation of any recommen-
dation that I would be making. 
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS, APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS 
The conditions under which a person can enter the employ of an 
employer and continue in that employ hâve traditionally been bargainable 
under private sector législation. Expect for those jurisdictions that hâve 
enacted right-to-work laws, employers and trade unions hâve been en-
titled to include in their collective agreements provisions ranging from 
the closed shop, on the one hand, to the open shop, on the other. Most 
collective agreements also contain provisions which make length of ser-
vice a factor either to govern or to be taken into account in the détermi-
nation of whether a person is to be promoted, laid off or recalled. Unions 
seek to circumscribe the discretionary élément of the employer in making 
décisions of the sort hère under discussion and to subject thèse décisions 
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to review by a neutral third party vested with authority to apply pre-
scribed or recognized standards. 
For fédéral public servants, as for public servants in many other 
jurisdictions in Canada, access to employment has for many years been 
governed by the « merit principle », which has been described as the 
requirement that public employées be recruited, selected and advanced 
under conditions of political neutrality, equal opportunity and compéti-
tion on the basis of merit, ail under the supervision of an independent 
commission. Thus, persons seeking employment in the public service, 
hâve been assured of a high degree of objectivity in the assessment of 
their entitlement to employment and of their qualifications for promotion 
that gave them protection equal to, or in excess of, that enjoyed by em-
ployées in the private sector, even in cases where protection was afforded 
them by the terms of a collective agreement. Starting from the premise 
that there ought to be equal opportunity of access to public employment 
for ail citizens, that the career development aspect of public employment 
must be protected and furthered and that thèse rights or privilèges are 
accorded a substantial measure of protection through the merit principle, 
I could not see my way clear to recommend that initial appointaient or 
promotion be made subject to collective bargaining. 
Layoffs and Recalls 
Layoff and recall presented quite a différent problem. They are 
both bargainable under private sector législation and the Chairman of 
the Public Service Commission had publicly declared himself in favour 
of removing layoff from the jurisdiction of the Commission — in effect 
saying that layoff be bargainable. It should be noted, however, that his 
proposai did not go so far as to treat recall in the same way. In con-
sidering the situation, I was convinced that the two items — layoff and 
recall — were inextricably intertwined and could not be separated. My 
first inclination was to recommend that both should be made bargain-
able. However, I could not put out of my mind the problems that such 
a course would create in the public service. As the report states : 
To accord to each bargaining agent at this time the right to bargain 
on lay-off and recall on a unit-by-unit basis would lead in the future 
to the possible, indeed one might say in some cases the probable, 
ghettoization of employées in spécifie occupational groups, or sub-
groups or bargaining units within an occupational group (within con-
ceivably narrow geographical boundaries). The situation can be aptly 
pictured by paraphrasing a quotation that appears in the report of the 
Task Force on Labour Relations: Though the employées within the 
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bargaining unit would be equal to each other, they would be unequal 
with others outside the unit; a little egalitarian island would hâve 
been created in the midst of a sea of inequality. Artificial barriers 
might be erected against the movement of laid off employées across 
bargaining unit lines to available positions for which they are 
qualified. The protection in law of length of service, which the bar-
gaining agents are so anxious to hâve considered as a factor in de-
termining the order of redundancy, lay-off and recall, would become 
meaningless for many employées. It is imperative that, in any plan 
devised to deal with lay-off, for whatever reason, and with recall in 
the Public Service, safeguards be built in that will prevent érosion 
of the traditional protection provided by the employer in the past for 
long service employées. Should this protection be significantly 
diminished, whether it be by collective bargaining or otherwise, there 
would undoubtedly be a public outcry that would lead ultimately to 
législative revocation of any power that might be conferred on the 
parties to deal with thèse matters wholly on a bargaining unit basis. 7 
One approach to which considération was given for a time was that 
layoff and recall be made bargainable but that the provisions in this 
regard should not be brought into force until a year after a new législa-
tion became operative. During that year, the parties would be encouraged 
in coalition bargaining in the hope that such bargaining would establish 
a pattern of layoff and recall extending across bargaining unit lines in 
the hope that that pattern would continue to prevail. This approach was 
abandoned as unsuitable. The recommendation that was made was that ; 
. . . the Public Service Commission be vested with authority to 
establish by régulation 
(a) the order in which employées whose duties and 
responsibilities are substantially the same are to be 
laid off, and 
(b) the order in which employées who hâve been laid 
off and who hâve the minimum qualifications re-
quired for appointment to a vacant position are to 
be recalled, 
so as to provide for préférence of employment to be given, as the 
Commission may deem appropriate having regard to géographie, 
organizational, occupational or any other relevant considération, to 
the employée who has the longest continuous service in the Public 
Service. 8 
7 Ibid., pp. 74-75. 
8 Ibid., p. 76. 
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If this recommendation is accepted and the parties do not make the 
suggested solution work, layoff and recall can easily be made a matter 
for joint decision-making at a later date. An extension of the scope of 
bargaining is always within the realm of practical politics; to narrow the 
scope, once a matter has been conceded, is probably impossible. In 
assessing the significance of the recommendations on layoff and recall, 
one should also bear in mind the collatéral recommendations calling for 
statutory notice for employées about to be laid off, the period of notice 
being fixed on a sliding scale in accordance with length of service. 
Classification 
One of the major targets on which the bargaining agents drew a 
bead was the classification process. A person's classification affects a 
wide range of his rights and interests, as well as the rights and interests 
of his bargaining agent — the bargaining unit in which he is included, 
pay plans that may be established through negotiation or by arbitral 
award, his rank and tenure, and that may affect the whole business of 
what is known in the Public Service as « red-circling ». In principle, 
classification or its counterpart is a bargainable item under private sector 
législation. However, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the 
détermination of classification standards has in fact become a subject of 
joint decision-making. The Co-operative Wage Survey in the Steel Indus-
try has received a good deal of attention, but I believe it is fair to say 
that, apart from that effort, classification standards generally corne into 
the bargaining picture in the private sector in tangential fashion. 
During my interviews with the bargaining agents, it became obvious 
that, if the subject of classification standards were included within the 
scope of bargaining under the fédéral public service législation, it would 
be a subject that would occupy the centre of the stage for many bar-
gaining units. The matter was explored exhaustively. As I said in the 
report : 
Every aspect of the question as to whether classification standards 
should be included within the scope of bargaining received a good 
deal of attention during my interviews with the représentatives of 
the bargaining agents and with the Treasury Board Secrétariat. The 
nature and quality of classification standards, the dimensions of the 
problems that would confront the parties if classification standards 
were made bargainable, the time that might be required to develop 
a proper standard, the time relationship between negotiations for the 
renewal of a collective agreement and the development of a standard, 
the total resources that would be required by the parties if they 
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embarked on a program of bargaining standards, the problems that 
would confront third parties called upon to résolve an impasse if 
one should be reached in the course of bargaining — the list could 
be amplified almost ad infinitum — ail were thoroughly can-
vassed. 9 
It may be worthwhile at this point to draw together briefly the 
main recommendations in the report on classification. The report does 
not recommend that classification standards be bargainable, but it does 
recommend that classification standards be subject to consultation. No 
altération in a standard would be capable of being made effective without 
adéquate consultation. In discussions on public sector collective bargain-
ing législation, the term « consultation » has, in some quarters, acquired 
what can almost be described as an unsavoury connotation. I drew 
attention in the report to what had been accomplished in the Public 
Service through consultation over the years. It can be said without equiv-
ocation that the record is impressive. I am convinced that collective bar-
gaining would hâve achieved much less than it did over the last seven 
years if it had not been preceded over a long period by an extensive 
pattern of consultation. 
However that may be, the consultation called for by the recom-
mendations in the report contemplâtes a process that is much more 
formai, and I would hope more effective, than what is said to occur under 
« meet and consult » statutes in other jurisdictions. Consultation is to 
begin within a relatively short period after formai notice to consult is 
given under the législation. The Board is to be kept informed of every 
recourse to consultation and I anticipate that it will endeavour to make 
sure that consultation is not an exercise in futility. It is not contemplated 
that the Board will act as a référée throughout the consultation process, 
but it will be able to keep a weather eye open and offer sage counsel if 
it appears the parties are headed for serious trouble. It must be recognized 
at ail times that the responsibility for settling disputes rests primarily 
with the parties and nothing should be done to destroy or undermine 
that sensé of responsibility. Once consultation has commenced, it cannot 
be « broken off » without the consent of the Chairrnan of the Board 
unless and until a conciliator has been appointed and has had a reason-
able opportunity of attempting to résolve any impasse that may arise. 
Either party has the right to invoke third-party intervention if consulta-
tion does not produce satisfactory results. In addition, the Chairrnan of 
9 ibid., p. 104. 
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the Board is given authority on his own initiative, but after discussion 
with the parties, to involve a conciliator in the consultation process. 
The législation would also spell out the nature of the obligation to 
consult. When notice is properly given, the parties would be required to 
meet and commence to consult within fixed time limits and make every 
reasonable effort to reach an agreement. A party aggrieved by a failure 
of the other party to observe this provision would be entitled to file a 
complaint with the Board. The report of the Woods Task Force 10 casts 
doubt on the wisdom of including in législation a requirement that the 
parties bargain in good faith. The authors of that report said « . . .we 
cannot envisage such a duty being amenable to légal enforcement, except 
perhaps to the extent of an obligation to exchange positions ». n Whatever 
the situation may be in the private sector. I cannot agrée that the con-
clusion of the Task Force is applicable to conditions in the public sector. 
There — and initially in so far as the fédéral scène is concerned — I 
hâve found that even a suggestion by the Board or by an adjudicator in 
the course of a proceeding or in a décision that a party did not act in 
good faith has had a salutary effect on the way in which the parties 
thereafter conduct their affairs. I venture to predict that the same attitude 
will continue in the future. 
The doubts that Task Force entertained with regard to légal re-
quirements for good faith bargaining — and the same doubts would arise 
in respect of the requirement for good faith consultation — are based on 
the view that, in those jurisdictions, particularly in the United States, 
where extensive use has been made of procédures for redress where bad 
faith in bargaining is alleged, there has been a development of « an ela-
borate jurisprudence on the issue of good faith bargaining, revolving largely 
around what subjects must be bargained, what may be bargained and 
what a party cannot insist be bargained » n. Under our fédéral public 
service législation, thèse issues are dealt with otherwise than as aspects 
of good faith bargaining and the Board would be free on a complaint of 
the sort hère under discussion to dévote its attention to devising a remedy, 
of bad faith were established, that would be more in keeping with what I 
believe to be the real purpose for which such a provision is enacted. It 
will serve as a challenge to our ingenuity. 
10 Canadian Industrial Relations, The Report of the Task Force on Labour 
Relations, The Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1969. 
n Ibid., p. 163. 
12 Ibid. 
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The recommendations in the report with regard to consultation do not 
rely on pronouncement of guilt and solemn adjurations to act in a proper 
manner. One of the concomitants of a change of classification standards 
may be the détermination of the level of rémunération to which an em-
ployée may be entitled. Where consultation has been terminated, the 
employer would be required to give notice to the bargaining agent within 
a fixed period of any revised standard to be instituted. The bargaining 
agent would hâve the right to call upon the employer to consult in good 
faith on a new rate of pay for positions to which the revised classification 
standard applies and, if the Board is satisfied that the employer has not 
consulted in good faith, it may direct the parties to continue to consult 
and that the revised classification standard shall not be made effective 
for such period of time as it considers appropriate. This formula may not 
go so far as fully to satisfy a bargaining agent where the employer in the 
final analysis rejects a claim by the bargaining agent that the existing 
classification standard is inadéquate or inéquitable. I beleive it does go 
a long way along the route that should lead to a rational resolution of 
disputes regarding classification standards. I am convinced that one thing 
that will keep ail parties « honest » is the realization that « If the recom-
mended consultation process fails to meet the needs of the parties after 
it has been given a fair trial, they will undoubtedly seek other ways of 
resolving their différences » 13. The recommendation opens the door wide 
and it can never be closed again. 
The recommendations regarding consultation on classification stan-
dards must also be looked at in the light of the accompanying recom-
mendations on classification grievances. Authority to deal with such 
grievances is to be vested in the Board and would be exercised by mem-
bers of the Board endowed with the necessary qualifications for making 
an objective assessment of such grievances through a procédure that should 
afford an aggrieved employée a reasonable assurance that justice has 
been done. Nothing I hâve just said should be taken to reflect on the 
existing classification review procédure. However, it is inévitable, as 
the report points out that, « with the délégation of classification authority 
to departments, the views of the classification review board in most cases 
appears to the employée concerned to be a departmental voice which 
cannot be dissociated in any real sensé from that of the person who made 
the initial classification décision ». 14. The visible independence of the 
ï3 Employer-Employée Relations... op. cit., p. 11. 
14 Ibid., p. 199. 
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Board should go a long way to remove a cloud that now hovers over the 
classification review process. 
CONCLUSION 
I have heard it said in some quarters that many of the recommen-
dations are procédural in nature. I would remind you of a statement by 
Maitland, the great légal historian, which has become part of the folklore 
of common law lawyers — a great deal of substantive law is concealed 
in the interstices of procédure. 
Les relations entre employeurs et employés dans la fonction publique 
au Canada 
Au Canada, le temps est bien passé où l'on s'opposait à la négociation col-
lective pour les employés des services publics, ce qui ne signifie pas qu'il n'existe 
plus de poches de résistance. Il n'en reste pas moins que l'adoption, en 1967, de la 
Loi sur les relations de travail dans la fonction publique fut un événement de la plus 
haute importance. Le gouvernement qui se propose d'adopter une loi sur les 
relations de travail dans le secteur privé peut agir avec objectivité, se placer 
au-dessus des parties, puisqu'il n'est pas l'employeur. La situation est bien différente 
lorsqu'il s'agit de lois qui vont s'appliquer à ses propres employés; il se trouve 
alors ainsi à limiter ses propres intérêts et ses propres privilèges. Aussi, fallait-il une 
bonne dose de courage politique pour présenter une telle mesure. 
La Commission Heeney, instituée pour étudier la question, avait à tenir compte 
de ce qui existait antérieurement et à voir quels nouveaux droits et quelles nou-
velles obligations elle pouvait accorder. D'autre part, personne ne savait comment 
le nouveau mécanisme allait fonctionner. Ni l'employeur ni les associations n'avaient 
la moindre expérience dans le domaine de la négociation collective. La Commission 
de la fonction publique avait autorité en matière de nomination et de promotion, 
mais elle ne pouvait que faire des recommandations en matière d'incompétence 
et d'insuffisance professionnelle. Enfin, tant le gouvernement que les groupements 
existants hésitaient à se départir des pouvoirs et des avantages dont ils jouissaient 
sous la législation antérieure. Ils redoutaient donc l'implantation d'un régime nou-
veau et inconnu. 
Les auteurs de la nouvelle législation s'en faisaient également au sujet de la 
nature de la collectivité à laquelle elle allait s'appliquer et de la dispersion de ses 
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membres. Cette collectivité s'étendait à 230,000 personnes qui appartenaient à 
différentes associations lesquelles formeraient autant de groupes distincts. Les 
négociations avec autant de groupes à peu près en même temps pesaient lourd sur 
les épaules des représentants du gouvernement. Il fallait encore tenir compte de 
la complexité de cet ensemble : cols bleus qui, dans le secteur privé, bénéficiaient 
depuis longtemps du droit de négociation collective; cols blancs qui, à l'extérieur 
de la fonction publique, depuis quelques années, adhéraient aux syndicats en 
nombre considérable sans compter les membres des professions libérales tradition-
nelles et aussi d'autres professions qui considéraient l'avènement du syndicalisme 
comme incompatible avec leurs véritables intérêts. Enfin, cette communauté de 
travailleurs était dispersée à travers un pays extrêmement vaste. 
Comment, en pareille conjoncture, assurer un minimum d'uniformité dans 
l'établissement des conditions de travail ? Il y avait aussi la question du droit de 
grève. Beaucoup de fonctionnaires la trouvait impensable et il fallait trouver un 
moyen de résoudre cette question. 
Le rapport de la Commission Heeney évita toute approche théorique de ces 
problèmes. C'est pourquoi la loi de 1967 fut, sur plusieurs points, fort différente 
de ce qui existait dans le secteur privé. 
Nous voici maintenant en 1973. On a décelé certaines faiblesses dans le mé-
canisme mis en place. Les agents de négociation ont goûté aux fruits de la parti-
cipation aux décisions sur des sujets qui relevaient autrefois de la discrétion de 
l'employeur. Tout cela faisait partie d'un processus normal d'évolution. Il importait 
de faire le point. On a confié la tâche de réexaminer la loi à l'auteur même 
s'il était président de la Commission qui avait assuré le fonctionnement de la légis-
lation initiale et qu'il l'avait vantée tant et plus. Il a accepté parce que tout le 
monde, gouvernement et agents de négociation, lui ont fait confiance. Il fallait 
faire vite à cause de la période des renouvellements de conventions collectives 
qui approchaient. Dans ce nouvel examen de la situation, il importait de tenir 
compte de plusieurs facteurs : nature et organisation de la fonction publique; 
capacité des agents de négociation et de l'employeur de traiter certains sujets dans 
un contexte de négociation, possibilité pour la Commission d'agir efficacement 
dans des cadres très élargis, désir de garder une bonne mesure d'uniformité entre 
la législation applicable au secteur privé et au service public. 
Dans la deuxième partie de son travail, l'auteur considère brièvement qiuelques-
uns de ces points. Le premier point qui a été retenu fut de viser au maintien des 
conditions uniformes pour tous les groupes et tout le territoire en vue d'empêcher 
la balkanisation du service public par la signature de conventions collectives qui 
tendraient à établir tout un réseau de droits acquis difficiles à briser plus tard 
sous un régime de négociation concertée. 
En ce qui concerne le contenu des conventions collectives, il s'agissait de savoir 
si les parties étaient assez bien équipées pour s'engager dans certains domaines 
nouveaux. Il n'en fallait pas trop. Il faut du temps à un organisme pour obtenir la 
crédibilité et il lui en faut peut-être davantage pour digérer une nouvelle pièce 
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législative. C'est pourquoi, dans cette tâche de rénovation de la loi, l'auteur dit 
avoir visé à être concret, pratique. La qualité maîtresse d'un rapport d'une com-
mission d'enquête, c'est de rendre hommage à « l'art du possible ». 
Parmi les recommandations, l'auteur en discute deux : le problème de l'an-
cienneté et celui du classement des emplois. Sur le premier point, la Commission 
n'a pas cru devoir recommander l'application des principes d'ancienneté aux 
promotions parce que le système bien établi de l'avancement au mérite dans la 
fonction publique a assuré une protection valable aux fonctionnaires. Les mises 
à pied et les rappels au travail posaient un problème différent. Cependant, la 
Commission n'a pas cru devoir recommander qu'ils soient négociables, du moins 
dans l'immédiat. Elle a plutôt suggéré que la Commission de la fonction publique 
fasse un règlement qui permette aux employés mis à pied d'être rappelés au travail 
lorsqu'il y a des positions vacantes pour lesquelles ils possèdent les qualifications 
minimales requises. 
En ce qui a trait à la classification, étant donné l'impossibilité pratique d'arri-
ver à des accords rapides sur des sujets aussi complexes, il a été recommandé de 
mettre sur pied des mécanismes de consultation obligatoire qui pourraient éventuel-
lement conduire à l'insertion de cette matière dans le processus de négociation 
collective. On ne guérit pas tous les maux d'une société du soir au matin et il 
fallait éviter de faire pire en voulant faire trop bien, et cela d'autant plus que la 
Commission a le pouvoir d'agir en ce qui concerne le traitement des griefs de 
classification. 
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